Our Stories

A collection of our Blogs, Articles, and Whitepapers

Decoding SIS: Are You Doing What’s Necessary to Prevent Disasters?

What is hiding under the radar of a plant SIS? Risk assessments define hazard consequences with assumed initiating event frequencies.

Integrating PHA LOPA Outputs into Effective SIS Engineering

We can help you pick up your PHA/LOPA which maybe been put to the side and provide the services to set you up for the safety system...

Considerations for Effective Gas Detector Placement

The analysis of existing gas detection systems has shown that the primary limiting factor in the effectiveness of a system is incorrect...

Cost considerations for Burner Management Systems (BMS)

(and where picking safety integrity levels on burner management systems makes sense) Safety is always a primary concern at any industrial...

SIL ratings and certification for fire & gas system hardware | Is industry barking up the wrong tree?

There are many devices (sensors, logic solvers and final elements) used in safety instrumented systems that are independently certified...

IPL/CMS- Integrity Management of Non-SIS Independent Protection Layers after the LOPA

This paper discusses the identification, selection, implementation and management of Non-SIF IPLs through the process lifecycle.

How Taking Credit for Planned and Unplanned Shutdowns Can Help You Achieve Your SIL Targets

Achieving Safety Integrity Level (SIL) targets can be difficult when proof test intervals approach turnaround intervals of five years or mor

Case Study of a Safety Instrumented Burner Management System (SI-BMS)

This paper will cover: the development of a SIS front end loading package the project cost savings realized attributed to following the saf

Can we achieve Safety Integrity Level 3 (SIL 3) without analyzing Human Factors?

Incorporate quantitative Human Factors into a SIL analysis. Representative operating units at various stages of maturity in human factors an

What is Truth? Do SIL Calculations Reflect Reality?

Are random hardware failures the only thing that cause a safety instrumented function (SIF) to fail? What if our assumptions are wrong? What