by Ron Nichols Introduction to Using RAGAGEP for Overpressure Risk Mitigation : Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a key tool used by the chemical, oil, and gas industries to assist companies in identifying, implementing and managing the critical safeguards needed to achieve their risk tolerance criteria. The Process Hazard analysis for some sites may be regulatory driven (e.g., Occupational, Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA’s) 29 CFR 1910.119 Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM), or the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA’s) 40 CFR 68 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions (RMP)). During the PHA the team identifies consequences of concern arising from potential process deviations, identifies existing safeguards, or if LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) is required, the Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) available to reduce the likelihood of the consequence to a tolerable risk level. If the team identifies a gap between the potential event likelihood, severity and the minimum target set by the company, the team will propose recommendations to close the gap. An overpressure scenario can be a significant contributor to the risk of a facility. Overpressure of pressure vessels, piping, and other equipment can result in loss of containment of flammable or toxic materials. This paper will develop guidance including related RAGAGEP (Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice) to help engineers and designers participate in the safety lifecycle for managing the risk of overpressure. Unlock this download by completing the form:

by Emily Henry, PE, CFSE As best stated in the IEC 61511-2 standard, “the purpose of adopting a systematic safety lifecycle approach towards a safety instrumented system (SIS) is to ensure that all the activities necessary to achieve functional safety are carried out and that it can be demonstrated to others that they have been carried out in an appropriate order.” Conforming to the ISA84/IEC 61511 design and management requirements for a SIS throughout a process safety project requires attention to detail every step of the lifecycle, and a well-established site or corporate SIS guideline can help set a company up for success. This blog describes key considerations to developing SIS guidelines, with the SIS lifecycle generalized into three main sections: Concept Through Startup, Operations and Maintenance, and Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning. Concept Through Startup Concept Through Startup encompasses Phases 1 through 4 of the IEC 61511 standard which includes hazard and risk assessments, allocation of safety functions to protection layers, Safety Requirements Specification (SRS), and design of an SIS. A hazard and risk assessment is the starting point since it sets the foundation of the overall hazard level at a site. The team should identify any significant hazards or concerns and establish the need for a SIS based on the plant design and operating system. The company’s risk tolerance is also a key consideration since a low hazard site with very tight risk tolerance may result in driving more need for a safety system than a high hazard site with a low risk tolerance. It is also important to understand what categories of risk drive the need for the safety system. There are two risk drivers sites must consider at a minimum – the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requiring both onsite and offsite personnel safety and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requiring environmental protections. Other risk drivers a facility may be concerned about are financial and reputational drivers. Once hazards have been identified, the next step is to establish the safety system requirements. A conceptual specification can help provide an overall picture of the whole system before diving into the details of the individual protection layers involved. For example, a big picture concept is to differentiate between the basic control system and the safety system. Basic control systems are the first response to maintain continuous operation with the end goal of a profitable product; safety systems focus on operating the plant safely and are initiated if the control system does not return the process to a normal state, ideally without significantly impeding the operability or profitability of the site. The Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) dives into the detailed requirements; a well-honed SRS includes the requirements for all the SIS lifecycle stages described in IEC 61511. Further details may be incorporated on how the basic process control system (BPCS) and SIS communicate (e.g., gateway, hardwired connections, etc.) as well as how the SIS interfaces with other systems. SIS design can encompass fine-tuned details that are not readily meaningful to an audience at large and may only be truly meaningful to those performing safety verification calculations. For this reason, a corporate SIS program ideally provides well-grounded templates, document samples, and guidance for creation of new documents. It also clearly defines what should be covered in the site or corporate SRS. The details should be understandable and not buried in other documents to maximize consistency and minimize human factors error. Operations and Maintenance Operations and Maintenance encompasses Phases 5 through 8 of the IEC 61511 standard, which includes safety system installation, commissioning and validation, operation and maintenance, modification, and decommissioning. Once a process has been installed and commissioned, it needs to be actively operated and maintained. It takes a number of years of experience in operation of a safety system for a Functional Safety Assessment (FSA) to truly reveal trends of how the SIS responds to process deviations. If a SIS needs to be modified or decommissioned, a Management of Change (MOC) is essential to flag whether the modification is Process Safety Management (PSM) oriented and if a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) for the change is required. MOCs are a key consideration to reducing human factors errors during SIS modification since they help control system access and provide a vendor management list and/or an approved critical devices list. This allows anyone replacing SIS devices or doing maintenance work to recognize which devices are approved for use in critical safety service. Critical device lists are most effective when they are orderly, easy to interpret, and easy to access. Properly managing all the pieces and parts during decommissioning must be addressed as well. Sometimes only a portion of a SIS – such as a single loop – may be decommissioned, while other times the entire SIS may be decommissioned to upgrade to a newer system. Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning Management of Functional Safety and Lifecycle Planning encompasses Phases 9 through 11 of the IEC 61511 standard. These phases cover safety system verification, management of functional safety, FSAs and audits, and safety lifecycle structure and planning. Clause 5.2.2 of Phase 10 describes the organizational structure necessary to ensure that roles dedicated throughout the SIS lifecycle are clearly defined and personnel have the skills for their respective responsibilities. It is key to know who will be involved in the safety system lifecycle including corporate leaders, site personnel, contractors, vendors, in addition to how they will be managed (e.g., training, extent of accountability, etc.). The SIS lifecycle management program should be defined in such a way that every person involved is aware of the importance of any decisions made around the SIS as well as their part within the process of making or implementing those decisions. Participants in safety lifecycle management must also understand what constitutes proper execution of duties to fulfill their lifecycle responsibility functions in a timely manner. The corporate or site SIS lifecycle management program should also minimize the possibility of a project team preference driving crucial safety decisions as opposed to IEC 61511 requirements. Clause 5.2.6.2 of Phase 10 describes the SIS auditing process. Audits are required to assess the SIS over time to ensure it continues to meet the requirements of the IEC 61511 standard. As a SIS continues through each phase of the lifecycle, independent audits check for any potential safety risks or human error and ensure the people involved are properly trained and capable of competently fulfilling their duties. Safety lifecycle structure and planning is covered in Phase 11. Some key planning considerations to prepare a SIS corporate or site standard are to define in advance an agreed upon safety lifecycle of the SIS which will be implemented, map out each phase and stage shown in Figure 8 of IEC 61511 with consideration to assumptions or information that may not be available until later phases, and identify the techniques needed in order to carry out each phase. After laying out a lifecycle roadmap, the agreed upon details – such as design parameter assumptions for SIL verification, failure rate data, effectiveness and approved type of proof test to be carried out – should be incorporated into the corporate or site SIS guidelines. When planning how to implement the SIS application program, consideration should be given to device degradation. For example, will devices have internal diagnostics available? Will they output a fault signal under specific conditions? Will any kind of deviation alarming be implemented between devices? Could device faults be tripled, assuming there could be a hazardous state that the process is not protected against? Or will the operator be allowed time to identify the fault, correct it, and continue to run the process safely? When these decisions are made, other safeguards should be acknowledged as well. Such as the idea that sites may desire to allow the SIS to “ride through” a received fault signal if there are redundant field devices installed (unless it is the last protected device), or sites may desire not to allow the system to “ride through” a received fault signal if there are no redundant safeguards available. Proper documentation control is absolutely critical to managing site or corporate SIS standards as well. The site or corporate SIS standards and any associated documents need to not only be easy to understand but also readily available and accessible to anyone who may need to reference them. Files should be saved in an intuitive and logical folder location and should not be stored exclusively on any vendor system. Finally, timeliness is a key consideration to establishing corporate or site SIS standards. Critical decisions made after the PHA and before detailed SIS design have significant impacts later in the lifecycle – such as financial risk due to late discoveries on capital projects. Simply put, the sooner a standard is agreed upon and implemented, the better. If you want a consistent and meaningful approach, consider developing your site or corporate SIS standard before design has been completed. One caveat is the corporate or site SIS standard should be established with a full understanding of the SIS in advance. If you are new to PSM or SIS, consider selecting a process safety consultancy with deep experience and expertise to assist you in navigating the IEC 61511 safety lifecycle from hazard and risk assessment through design, commissioning, and operations. SIS lifecycle decisions can be extremely costly and unnecessary if reviewed through too conservative a lens, while other lifecycle decisions can be dangerous if not reviewed through enough of a conservative lens. The key is to find the right balance and level of detail appropriate to your facility to avoid unnecessary costs or unmitigated safety risk. Keywords: ISA-61511 IEC 61511 SIS Corporate Standards Program Development Functional Safety Planning

We asked a few our engineers to answer: Why did you get into Engineering? How do we/engineers make an impact on the greater community? Founded by NSPE in 1951, EWeek(link is external) (February 19–25, 2023) is dedicated to ensuring a diverse and well-educated future engineering workforce by increasing understanding of and interest in engineering and technology careers. Today, EWeek is a formal coalition of more than 70 engineering, education, and cultural societies, and more than 50 corporations and government agencies. Dedicated to raising public awareness of engineers' positive contributions to quality of life, EWeek promotes recognition among parents, teachers, and students of the importance of a technical education and a high level of math, science, and technology literacy, and motivates youth, to pursue engineering careers in order to provide a diverse and vigorous engineering workforce. Each year, EWeek reaches thousands of schools, businesses, and community groups across the U.S.

by Keith Brumbaugh Is our industry stuck in the past? The current industry trend is to only look at random hardware failures in safety integrity level (SIL) probability of failure on demand (PFD) calculations. No one would appear to be updating assumptions as operating experience is gained. Hardware failure rates are generally fixed in time, assumed to be average point values (rather than distributions), and either generic in nature or specific to a certain set of hardware and/or conditions which the vendors determine by suitable tests or failure mode analysis. But are random hardware failures the only thing that cause a safety instrumented function (SIF) to fail? What if our assumptions are wrong? What if our installations do not match vendor assumptions? What else might we be missing? How are we addressing systematic failures? One obvious problem with incorporating systematic failures is their non-random nature. Many functional safety practitioners claim that systematic errors are addressed (i.e., minimized or eliminated) by following all the procedures in the ISA/IEC 61511 standard. Yet even if the standard were strictly adhered to, could anyone realistically claim a 0% chance of a SIF failing due to a human factor? Some will say that systematic errors cannot be predicted, much less modeled. But is that true? This paper will examine factors which tend to be ignored when performing hardware-based reliability calculations. Traditional PFD calculations are merely a starting point. This paper will examine how to incorporate systematic errors into a SIF’s real-world model. It will cover how to use Bayes theorem to capture data after a SIF has been installed — either through operating experience or industry incidents — and update the function’s predicted performance. This methodology can also be used to justify prior use of existing and non-certified equipment. Unlock this download by completing the form:

by Michael D. Scott, PE, CFSE, aeSolutions Founder & Brittany Lampson, PhD Implementing a Safety Instrumented Burner Management (SI‐BMS) can be challenging, costly, and time consuming. Simply identifying design shortfalls/gaps can be costly, and this does not include costs associated with the capital project to target the gap closure effort itself. Additionally, when one multiplies the costs by the total number of heaters at different sites, these total costs can escalate quickly. However, a “template” approach to implementing SI‐BMS in a brownfield environment can offer a very cost effective solution for end users. Creating standard “templates” for all deliverables associated with a SI‐BMS will allow each subsequent SI‐BMS to be implemented at a fraction of the cost of the first. This is because a template approach minimizes rework associated with creating a new SIBMS package. The ultimate goal is to standardize implementation of SI‐BMS in order to reduce engineering effort, create standard products, and ultimately reduce cost of ownership. Unlock this download by completing the following form: What is a BMS? What is Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) What is Function Safety?

By Chris Hickling A Fire & Gas System (FGS) philosophy provides a solid foundation for the design of an effective gas detection system, which in turn helps protect plant and personnel from gas releases and resulting flammable and/or toxic effects. An FGS philosophy for a process facility that is not fit for purpose or does not have a firm auditable basis can increase the likelihood of undetected leaks incurring risk to personnel or unnecessary expenses for the company. Under-engineering a gas detection system has safety implications, while over-engineering has commercial implications such as increasing capital and maintenance costs without significantly reducing risk. The workflow for an FGS philosophy can be summarized in the following steps: Assess FGS requirements – review regulatory requirements, corporate standards, pertinent Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) recommendations, and Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) Develop FGS philosophy and procedures – review materials and properties (flammable, toxic, or inert), process flow, and risk tolerance criteria Define FGS scenarios and zones – determine hazards using data for process conditions, weather, occupancy, and airflow data, and drawings such as plot plans, Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs), and Cause & Effects (C&Es) Define zone FGS performance requirements – Develop criteria to assess facility layout and define areas Develop criteria for FGS detector placement So what makes an effective FGS philosophy? Firstly, it's important to establish the scope of the FGS system. Is it intended to protect on-site personnel and equipment, offsite community, and/or environment? A comprehensive review of the entire facility is essential – if individual process units at the facility are exclusively analyzed for gas detection, it could result in a fractured response and unforeseen effects at other units. A gas cloud doesn't care where it's released or where it's going, and it doesn't respect boundaries. Secondly, the FGS philosophy should follow applicable codes like NFPA 72 and be applied consistently across the facility. Issues could arise if different areas of the plant use different gas detection technologies or alarm levels; for example, if one unit of the plant alarms at 10% of the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and another unit alarms at 20% LEL, or there are inconsistent color of warning strobes for a toxic gas release. Consistency in gas detection, alarms, and encompassing standardized procedure(s) helps the operators and employees respond efficiently. Additionally, the FGS philosophy should lay down the criteria for decisions on gas detection required and appropriate mitigative response such as alarm levels (e.g., alarm at 10% LEL). The FGS philosophy also helps decide the voting criteria for the number of gas detectors to take action. For example, two out of two (2oo2) gas detectors may be required to alarm before starting the sprinkler system or dumping Halon. Finally, an FGS philosophy should be auditable. During its development, assumptions are made which feed into how the gas release is modeled and location of gas detectors. If a bad assumption is made and a leak later occurs, it is essential to be able to revisit the original FGS philosophy and assess the original basis for the design. If the gas detection system has a performance-based design, the layout of the system is documented so that it can be reviewed and adjusted. Traditional rules of thumb gas detector placement do not offer this ability to review and update the basis. Once these practices are incorporated into a facility's FGS philosophy, a comprehensive and well-documented FGS philosophy provides a solid foundation for the design of an effective and auditable gas detection system. Facilities can have a dependable basis to ensure an appropriate number of gas detectors in the appropriate locations, potentially lowering risk and minimizing costs for the gas detection system. nfpa gas detection

Update Provides a Migration Path for Existing FGS 1400 Installations Greenville, SC – October 10th, 2022 – aeSolutions, a consulting, engineering, and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services, today announced the release of an update to its FGS 1400 MK II Safety Instrumented Fire & Gas System (FGS) solution. Scalable for large industrial installations, the solution is designed to provide fire and gas protection based on a safety-rated control system. Available as a turnkey solution, the FGS 1400 MK II is pre-engineered, pre-configured, and pre-packaged, and is suitable for a wide variety of applications. The system has been updated to utilize Siemens process automation Simatic ET 200SP HA input/output (I/O) cards in place of existing I/O cards that are on Siemens’ mature product list and are being phased out. To ensure continuity of operations, the update will provide existing aeSolutions clients with an upgrade path to maintain their existing FGS 1400 MK II products. As the update is rolled out, aeSolutions can supply migration fabrication kits that will enable end users to easily migrate to the ET 200SP HA I/O cards. Moving forward, aeSolutions’ product lines will only offer the new ET 200SP HA I/O cards in the FGS 1400 products. “When spare parts are no longer available, this important update to the FGS 1400 MK II provides a migration path to future aeSolutions’ product lines that will only offer the new ET 200SP HA I/O cards,” said Warren Johnson, senior project manager at aeSolutions. “Our customers come from a range of sectors and include companies in the oil and gas, chemical, pharmaceutical, agricultural chemical, and hydrogen production industries. Businesses with a need for industrial-grade fire and gas systems look to aeSolutions to offer products that meet and exceed industry standards and expectations. While not all fire and gas systems are required to conform to ISA and IEC safety standards, our customers recognize the benefits of such a high-reliability system even for lower-risk applications. aeSolutions is proud to continue to set the standard by providing our customers with superior, up-to-date products.” As the premier solution for fire and gas alarm and control, the FGS 1400 MK II can be built on demand and combines required functionality into the latest generation of TÜV-certified safety programmable logic controller (PLC). The FGS 1400 MK II was designed to the same levels of safety availability and reliability as the systems that aeSolutions designs for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). By using the latest generation of a safety integration level (SIL) 3 safety-certified PLC as the logic solver, the FGS 1400 MK II provides the same demanding levels of performance required by the International Society of Automation (ISA) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) safety standards for safety-critical applications. Additionally, the FGS 1400 MK II meets Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for fire protection, has Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NRTL) certification for fire and gas, and is Factory Mutual (FM)-approved to be in conformance with the requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 72 and FM 3010 standards for fire alarming and mitigation control. The FGS 1400 MK II has also been FM-approved to be in conformance with FM Approvals’ Combustible Gas Standard 6320, Toxic Gas Detection Standard 6340, and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ISA 12.13.01 Performance Requirements for Combustible Gas Detectors standard. The FGS 1400 MK II has approval for either simplex or redundant processors, a variety of I/O configurations, including remote I/O, and a battery back-up/ charger subsystem. A critical component of the system is an FM-approved secondary power supply system consisting of a charger panel and an associated self-contained battery system. To support system design, aeSolutions has developed an FM-approved battery sizing tool that confirms the battery system design based on the specific requirements of each application. By using the same hardware/software platform as the Siemens Simatic PCS7 series, the FGS 1400 MK II can be integrated into the entire plant system solution. It offers the advantages of common Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs), spare parts, training, engineering/configuration tools, maintenance, and procedures to produce a dramatic saving in both installed costs as well as lifecycle costs. For more information about aeSolutions’ FGS products, visit https://www.aesolutions.com/fire-gas-products. About aeSolutions In business since 1998, aeSolutions is a consulting, engineering, and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services. They specialize in helping industrial clients achieve their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, control system design and integration, alarm management, and related operations and integrity management systems. For more information, visit www.aesolutions.com. Media Contact Kari Walker for aeSolutions Kari@redironpr.com @KariWalkerPR

(and where picking safety integrity levels on burner management systems makes sense) Safety is always a primary concern at any industrial site, and for good reason. But how much should you pay for that safety? While that question may have seemed blasphemous in days gone by, in today’s highly competitive business environment, unnecessary costs of any kind cannot be tolerated – and that includes safety instrumented systems, of which burner management systems are one type. Businesses want to optimize every dollar spent and maximize every dollar in return. A right sized safety system delivers the right amount of protection that a facility needs, requiring only the amount of money that can deliver the most risk reduction. This line of thinking becomes especially relevant when trying to identify the correct amount of risk reduction for a legacy burner management system. Selection of an overly conservative replacement system following prescriptive standards can have significant cost impact often without significant additional risk reduction over a BMS that is chosen based on valid safety integrity level selection techniques. The costs associated with upgrading according to prescriptive requirements typically originate from the significant mechanical rework that is required. Sometimes the cost is so high that it doesn’t get management approval. This is where the red flags in the executive suites can start to rise as they start sensing unjustified cost escalations or unmitigated risk exposure. Yes, they want safety, but they want it in context of what they need – enough safety that makes the risk tolerable for the business. “Right sizing” your BMS starts from a good targeted risk assessment of the BMS and fired equipment operation. A good assessment is the one that has a reasonably accurate estimate of likelihood and consequence. If the estimated likelihood is too frequent, or the consequence too severe, the safety integrity level (SIL) target may be set too high. This will result in an overly conservative and unnecessarily expensive system. On the other hand, if the consequence or likelihood is judged too low, the facility’s risks may not be adequately reduced. This also exposes the business to risks that could be ruinous; risks that the business is trying to mitigate. At the same time, the system design also needs to be consistent for similarly situated, similar types of fired equipment. The current prevalent techniques of assessing risk needs to be paired with the right amount of empirically backed experience to achieve this. This is where it pays to have a competent engineering partner that can help calibrate and deliver a right sized solution. Find more info on our Fired Equipment Services Page.

A hazard scenario-based, drill-down audit can uncover systematic issues brewing beneath the surface not often uncovered from a traditional compliance audit. This methodology exposes the pain points and, most importantly, the sources of those points by digging deep into the management system processes around Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)/Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Process Safety Information (PSI), Mechanical Integrity, Operating Procedures, and Management of Change (MOC). The audit findings provide a basis for revising the work flow to achieve the risk management objectives. A drill-down audit focuses on a trail that begins with the PHA/LOPA and the credited Independent Protection Layers (safeguards), then drills down through the management systems to ensure their integrity.  It checks the health of communications and data exchanged at the interfaces of the processes and the people. This approach provides visibility – and proof – into whether the information in the PHA/LOPA has been fully integrated into the process safety lifecycle. The audit methodology validates IPLs (Independent Protection Layers) are embedded in an organization’s operating discipline, meet all defined criteria, are inspected and tested, and are functioning as intended. The following are examples of a drill down audit trail for an Alarm IPL: A review of the PHA/LOPA should verify the operator, alarm sensor, and final elements used by the operator are independent of the Initiating Event and other IPLs for the scenario. A review of PSI would confirm alarm sensors are maintained on the critical IPL list and on the piping and instrumentation diagram; sensor data sheet and final elements are in place; and the basis for the Probability of Failure on Demand is well documented. Review of the mechanical integrity information should verify calibration and proof test procedures are available; testing, calibration and inspections are scheduled at a routine frequency; and calibration and proof test records are reviewed, actioned if required, and maintained.   The auditor interviews maintenance employees to see if they recognize the criticality of the alarm loop, it’s inspection and reliability. The auditor must confirm the alarm, along with consequences of deviation, intended operator action, and specific parameters/authorization for bypass of the alarm are documented in the appropriate operating procedures. The auditor confirms that the operator is formally trained on the alarm and the intended actions, but most importantly interviews operators to check their experience and intended action in the event they get an alarm. Much like a standard compliance audit, the auditor will also need to track a MOC to determine if changes to the alarms credited as IPLs are managed appropriately. Finally, the auditor needs to check the security of the IPL; its access control and with increasing emphasis it’s cyber security. Ultimately, organization’s need to ensure their hazardous processes are being operated within accepted risk tolerance and have a sense of assurance they are effectively managing their risks, identifying pain points, and relieving any undue pressure.

Greenville, SC – October 28, 2021 – aeSolutions, a consulting, engineering, and systems integration company, is excited to announce the release of aeAlarm, a proprietary alarm rationalization tool. aeAlarm is control system platform-agnostic and is adaptable across all industrial sectors. It is effective for projects of all types and sizes, including small project rationalizations and large site-wide efforts. Additionally, the tool creates a platform to compile process safety information and generates customized reports and tables to expedite data tracking for site specific Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Poor alarm management has been a critical factor in major process safety incidents throughout history. With the introduction of aeAlarm, rationalization teams have easy access to customized templates and dropdowns for severities and maximum time to respond, along with automatic population of alarm priority. aeAlarm processes unique tags one by one and allows the user to fill in consequences, causes, and operator actions. User-defined data fields can be added to incorporate site-specific requirements while maintaining compliance with the recommended documentation described in IEC 62682 and ISA/ANSI 18.2. The template feature allows users to create a rationalization spreadsheet with fields similar to the site’s alarm list. These fields can be filtered to facilitate a consistent rationalization of similar points such as fire and gas, rate of change alarms, safety showers, etc. “aeAlarm, was created to support the alarm rationalization process by providing a clear and concise approach to critical alarm documentation,” said Sarah Manelick, a Principal Specialist at aeSolutions, ISA IC39C Course Instructor and member of the ISA 18 Committee. “Additionally, aeAlarm uses a unique-to-the-industry consequence-based rationalization methodology that is much faster than legacy tag-based methods. This approach leaves more time for implementation and advanced alarm design techniques which together even further improves overall process safety performance.” aeSolutions offers comprehensive Alarm Management Services, including: · Alarm Philosophy Development · Gap Assessment of existing Alarm Philosophy · Alarm Management and Rationalization Training · Facilitation of Alarm Rationalizations using aeAlarm · Alarm Management Program Gap Assessments aeSolutions’ alarm management services help customers improve the performance of their alarm systems and increase the situational awareness of their operators. aeSolutions’ clients recognize there is a direct relationship between the implementation of effective alarm management techniques and the process safety performance of their plant. About aeSolutions In business since 1998, aeSolutions is a consulting, engineering and systems integration company that provides industrial process safety and automation products and services. They specialize in helping industrial clients achieve their risk management and operational excellence goals through expertise in process safety, combustion control and safeguarding, safety instrumented systems, control system design and integration, alarm management, and related operations and integrity management systems. For more information, visit www.aesolutions.com. Kari Walker for aeSolutions Kari@redironpr.com @KariWalkerPR

by Kelvin Severin PE Time is constantly working against operating equipment in a plant. Over time, components of the equipment reach the end of their useful lifespan and need to be replaced. Manufacturers go out of business or are no longer producing parts for antiquated equipment. The technology advances, and new and improved standardized models are developed, causing components to become outdated or obsolete. Many processing facilities in the United States were built decades ago and have never been upgraded. Maintaining aging equipment can be a challenge as parts for the old equipment are often no longer available or very expensive. For example, the manufacturer may no longer exist, or they may no longer produce the parts, or the components do not meet the newest revision of a regulatory standard. If aging equipment is not managed properly in relation to its expected lifespan, it can result in avoidable safety incidents, or maintenance and reliability issues. Most equipment has a specified life expectancy and pushing it beyond its useful life can put an operating facility at risk. Some older systems and instrumentation do not have the technology for diagnostics and therefore have no ability to query or troubleshoot the operating issue, resulting in extended shutdowns. Additionally, companies may face a loss of production and revenue in the event of mechanical issues with a piece of antiquated operating equipment, systems, or instrumentation that causes the process to go offline. A cost-effective first step to address aging equipment is a conceptual level screening checklist, that evaluates equipment systematically to identify deficiencies in the components. Facilities may be unaware of serious issues, and this checklist allows companies to make informed decisions and prioritize potential upgrades to aging equipment. This applies to both long-standing operating facilities as well as companies who recently purchased an existing facility, as they may not recognize the condition of all assets and/or older equipment they acquired. Refer to the aeSolutions blog, “Prioritizing Fired Equipment Upgrades Using Screening Checklists,” for further detail: https://www.aesolutions.com/post/prioritizing-fired-equipment-upgrades-using-screening-checklists After identifying areas of improvement, a plan can be developed for replacing the obsolete components that are approaching the end of their useful life. This plan should assess the safety concerns, mechanical concerns, and operational risks to the facility. It should also include a timeline for how soon the antiquated components should be replaced. The best replacement option is provided with qualities such as reliability and resilience to assure a long lifespan, aligning with regulatory codes, and adaptability to future system upgrades installed at the facility. Every facility should review its equipment to verify its life expectancy and ensure it is safe and reliable for continued operation. Suppose a facility is unable to find replacement parts or utilizes replacement parts sourced outside of the normal supply chain from the manufacturer to adapt to the existing system. In that case, this short-term solution could potentially perpetuate the mechanical and reliability issues. A conceptual level screening checklist can assess the status of aging equipment components, and proactive replacement measures can be taken to create a system of longevity and resilience going forward. Keywords: Obsolescence, Resilience, Robust, Outdated, Antiquated equipment, NFPA 85, NFPA 86, NFPA 87